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The recession’s heavy 
toll on world trade 
raises the possibility 
of deglobalization.
Trade, Globalization and the Financial Crisis
by Mark A. Wynne and Erasmus K. Kersting
The financial crisis that began in august 2007 and intensified in the 
fall of 2008 pushed the global economy into a severe downturn that some have 
called the Great recession. World trade collapsed at a pace unseen since the Great 
depression of the 1930s. The decline in trade and the protectionist instincts that 
invariably come to the fore in difficult economic times have raised concerns that 
today’s crisis may lead to deglobalization—a reversal of the globalization that 
has characterized the past three decades. 
In this economic letter, we will illustrate the crisis’ impact on world 
trade and examine the typical patterns of international trade over the business 
cycle. We urge caution in using trade data to estimate the extent of globalization 
or deglobalization. and we present evidence that international trade has fallen 
by more than expected given the course of the current business cycle.  EconomicLetter  Federal reserve Bank oF dallas 2   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas  EconomicLetter
Declines in 
international trade 
have exceeded the 
losses during 
the 1930s.
This raises the question of what 
might have accounted for the excess 
decline. We look at two possibilities: 
first, a direct effect on trade flows 
associated with a drying up of trade 
finance at the height of the crisis; 
second, a breakout of protectionist 
measures. We conclude that trade 
finance is the most likely explana-
tion. However, it’s vitally important 
to remain vigilant to the risks of 
protectionism. The Great Depression 
of the 1930s would have been less 
severe had countries not resorted to 
ultimately self-defeating protectionist 
measures. 
International Trade Collapses
According to the October 2009 
edition of the International Monetary 
Fund’s World Economic Outlook, 
international trade as measured by 
total exports of goods and services 
will decline 11.9 percent this year. 
Advanced economies’ exports will 
fall 13.6 percent, while emerging and 
developing economies face a more 
modest 7.2 percent slump (Chart 
1). Declines of these magnitudes are 
unprecedented. During the recession 
of 2001, for example, global trade 
increased 0.3 percent, largely due to 
continued export growth in the emerg-
ing market economies. 
One measure, based on work 
by the economic historians Barry 
Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, 
suggests that declines in international 
trade have exceeded the losses dur-
ing the 1930s. Indexing to the peaks 
in global industrial production in 
both episodes, global trade fell 32 
percent during the first year of the 
Great Recession, compared with 15 
percent during the first year of the 
Great Depression (Chart 2). Of course, 
trade continued to ebb for years in the 
1930s, an unlikely prospect this time 
around given the recent improvements 
in the world economy.
The collapse of world trade has 
manifested itself in shipping costs. 
While we don’t have a comprehensive 
measure of how much it costs to ship 
goods around the world, two closely 
watched indexes capture significant 
segments of the market. 
The Baltic Dry Index tells us what 
is going on with dry bulk commodi-
ties, such as coal, iron ore and grain. 
After peaking at 11,793 on May 20, 
2008, the index collapsed to 663 on 
Dec. 5, then posted gradual improve-
ments over the course of this year. 
The Harpex index, produced on a 
weekly basis by the shipbroking firm 
Harper Petersen, measures the cost 
of shipping containers. It dropped 76 
percent between February 2008 and 
June 2009.
Of course, the U.S. hasn’t been 
immune to these developments (Chart 
3). U.S. import volume peaked in the 
third quarter of 2007, when the finan-
cial crisis began. Export volume con-
tinued to rise until the second quarter 
of 2008, when the crisis went global.
So what, if anything, do these data 
tell us about the fate of globalization? 
Has globalization gone into reverse? To 
address this question, we consider two 
issues. The first centers on the normal 
behavior of international trade flows 
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over the business cycle. Are imports 
and exports more volatile than overall 
economic activity, or less volatile? The 
second involves the usefulness of trade 
flows to measure globalization. Does 
more international trade always mean 
more globalization?
Considering Deglobalization
Two points are noteworthy once 
we isolate U.S. business-cycle ups and 
downs from the economy’s long-run 
growth. First, exports and imports 
tend to move in the same direction 
as GDP—that is, they’re procyclical 
(Chart 4). Second, exports and imports 
are more volatile than the overall 
economy.
The scatter of points in Chart 
4A plots the cyclical component of 
U.S. exports each quarter against 
the cyclical component of U.S. GDP. 
Note that the line fitted to the scat-
ter is steeper than the 45-degree line. 
That is, when the cyclical component 
of GDP declines by a given amount, 
the cyclical component of exports 
tends to decline by more. Likewise, 
when the cyclical component of GDP 
increases by a given amount, the 
cyclical component of exports tends 
to increase by more. A similar pattern 
is seen in the scatter for the cyclical 
component of U.S. imports and GDP 
in Chart 4B.
GDP’s cyclical movements range 
between –5 percent and 5 percent, 
well below the low of –15 and high 
of 15 percent for both exports and 
imports. The average volatility of GDP 
(standard deviation) is about 1.7 per-
cent, compared with 5.6 percent for 
exports and 5.2 percent for imports. 
Why are trade flows so much 
more volatile than the overall econ-
omy? Part of the reason may be that 
trade is still heavily skewed toward 
goods rather than services. Measured 
by value, goods make up 70 per-
cent of U.S. exports and 84 percent 
of imports. By comparison, goods 
account for only a fifth of overall U.S. 
production, measured as a share of 
value added. Using a broader defini-
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U.S. Trade Tails Off, Too
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A global recession 
that reduced import 
demand will lead to 
declines in trade— 
but it needn’t 
signify a reversal of 
economic integration.
tion—the sum of agriculture, mining, 
construction and manufacturing—rais-
es goods’ share of the economy, but 
only to 30 percent. 
Because trade flows depend heav-
ily on the volatile goods sector, they 
tend to increase more in good times 
and decline more in bad times than 
the rest of the economy. If that’s so, it 
shouldn’t come as a great surprise that 
trade flows have dried up in the midst 
of a severe global recession. Far from 
telling us about incipient deglobaliza-
tion, the decline in trade may simply 
be a cyclical phenomenon.
There are other reasons to be 
skeptical of what trade flows can tell 
us about globalization. To economists, 
globalization is about the integration of 
national economies into a single global 
market. While imports and exports 
may be symptomatic of such integra-
tion, they’re not synonymous with it. 
Economists generally favor another 
measure—how close domestic prices 
are to the ones prevailing on world 
markets. 
One can illustrate this point with a 
simple supply and demand picture for 
some hypothetical good traded inter-
nationally (Chart 5A). Assume a world 
price at which we can buy as much 
as we want—thus, the supply curve is 
flat. How much we purchase will be 
determined by the domestic demand 
for imports of this good, the down-
ward slope indicating we’ll buy more 
as it gets cheaper. 
Transportation costs, barri-
ers to trade and other factors create 
a gap between the domestic and 
world prices. The size of this distor-
tion will determine just how much of 
the good we import and consume. 
Improvements in transport and com-
munications technology and more lib-
eral trade policies will reduce the dif-
ference between the home and world 
prices (Chart 5B). As domestic prices 
fall, trade will increase. This is what 
we mean by globalization.
But note that trade volumes 
can change without markets becom-
ing more integrated. For example, a 
Chart 4
Business Cycle Volatility Is Greater for Trade Flows
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domestic boom that made us willing 
to import more at every price would 
cause demand to shift rightward (Chart 
5C). The volume of trade would 
increase, but we’ve had no real gain 
in economic integration, properly 
defined. That is, prices didn’t fall.
The same thing can take place in 
reverse. A global recession that reduced 
import demand will lead to declines in 
trade—but it needn’t signify a rever-
sal of economic integration. And that, 
arguably, is what happened last fall 
and through the first half of this year. 
The financial crisis had its epi-
center in the U.S. housing market, 
and it was largely confined to slowing 
growth prospects in the North Atlantic 
region of the U.S., Canada and Europe 
for most of 2007 and 2008. During the 
crisis’ early stages, there was some 
belief that emerging market economies 
would be largely immune—the so-
called decoupling hypothesis. When 
things worsened after September 
2008, the advanced economies’ dra-
matic deterioration caused demand for 
emerging economies’ exports to drop. 
The crisis became truly global.
“Excess” Trade Declines 
The financial media carried a 
series of stories in the fall of 2008 
about the drying up of trade finance 
and its detrimental effect on trade 
flows, suggesting the financial crisis 
may have had a direct impact on trade 
flows, over and above the effect from 
declining economic activity.
Of course, determining cause and 
effect is a tricky business. With trade 
flows contracting along with economic 
activity, some decline in trade financ-
ing should be expected. What we 
might want to look at is evidence of 
a decline in trade beyond what we 
might have expected based on eco-
nomic fundamentals.
Two factors come immediately 
to mind as drivers of U.S. import 
demand over the long run—our level 
of income (the better off we are, the 
more we want to consume, including 
imports) and the value of the dollar 
Chart 5
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(the cheaper foreign goods and ser-
vices are, the more we buy). If we put 
these variables into a simple model, 
they do a reasonable job of explaining 
quarter-to-quarter fluctuations in U.S. 
imports.
Or at least they did until last fall. 
As the financial crisis unfolded, U.S. 
imports fell by more than could be 
justified by the changes in the funda-
mentals (Chart 6A). We see a similar 
situation with U.S. exports, using 
foreign income and the value of the 
dollar as the fundamental drivers of 
export growth in a statistical model 
(Chart 6B).
While statistical models often 
break down, this particular failure 
occurred in the midst of the global 
financial system’s greatest crisis since 
the Great Depression. Given all the 
anecdotal evidence, it seems reason-
able to conclude that the drying up 
of trade finance might have played an 
additional role in depressing interna-
tional trade.
So what exactly is trade finance? 
The broadest definition includes 
every kind of loan, insurance policy 
or guarantee directly tied to interna-
tional transactions—anything from the 
direct credit extended by exporters to 
government-backed guarantees issued 
by official export credit agencies. 
Other institutions involved in trade 
finance are commercial banks, multi-
lateral development banks and private 
insurers. 
What can we say quantitatively 
about the financial crisis’ impact 
on the availability of trade finance? 
Surprisingly little, it turns out. Hard 
numbers are difficult to obtain. No 
data series gives us a complete picture 
of the overall amount of finance sup-
porting international trade, probably 
because of the number and heteroge-
neity of parties involved.
A sliver of the trade finance pic-
ture is available in data on assets and 
liabilities categorized as traditional 
trade credit, extended by nonfinancial 
firms to their foreign customers. The 
series reports the difference between 
underlying transactions in goods and 
services and payments related to those 
transactions. The data represent net 
flows, which means they track chang-
es, not the amount of inflows and out-
flows themselves. 
The trade credit data include both 
short-term and long-term categories. 
Loans to finance trade fall into a dif-
ferent category, and it isn’t possible to 
distinguish loans specifically used to 
finance trade. In that sense, changes 
in trade credit positions serve as a 
lower bound for the total amount of 
trade finance. The series on liabilities 
represents the amount of trade credit 
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foreign countries extend to firms in a 
specific country. 
In 2008, the U.S., Japan and 
Germany saw record declines in trade 
credit liabilities (Chart 7A). The steep 
drops aren’t surprising given the scale 
of the recent crisis. A flight to safety by 
investors, banks and firms will result 
in reduced exposure to countries con-
sidered relatively risky. Note that credit 
availability seems to have improved 
dramatically as the financial crisis 
eased in 2009.
Tightening credit meant export-
ing companies faced buyers that were 
more severely credit-constrained. We 
would expect these firms to extend 
more short-term trade credit to com-
pensate for the lack of commercial 
financing for potential buyers. Data 
on the net change in trade credit 
extended show jumps in exposure for 
Japanese and U.S. firms through the 
fourth quarter of 2008 and for German 
firms through the first quarter of 2009 
(Chart 7B). 
The data suggest that exporting 
firms stepped in and granted credit 
as the financial crisis pinched other 
sources of trade finance. The nature of 
the recession matters. The downturn in 
2001 didn’t lead to dramatic changes in 
the amount of short-term trade credit 
extended, whereas the current crisis 
has changed financing conditions suf-
ficiently to cause a noticeable shift in 
exporting firms’ behavior.
Protectionism?
The apparent importance of 
finance in the trade collapse suggests, 
but doesn’t prove, that concerns about 
increased protectionism are over-
blown. Protectionism today is more 
subtle than in the past, coming more 
frequently in the guise of nontariff 
barriers rather than formal tariffs. One 
commonly resorted to protectionist 
measure is antidumping actions—and 
they give us a snapshot of protection-
ism in the past few years. 
In the second half of 2008, the 
World Trade Organization found a 
17 percent increase in the number 
of new antidumping investigations, 
compared with the same period in 
2007. However, these numbers are still 
well within the experience of the past 
decade and well short of the peaks 
seen in the 2001 recession (Chart 8).
While some protectionist mea-
sures have been introduced, they 
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Financial Crisis Takes Toll on Trade Credit
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haven’t approached what the world 
experienced in the 1930s. That’s due 
in no small part to the lessons of the 
Great Depression. But the scale of the 
current crisis and the likelihood of a 
sluggish recovery suggest the need for 
ongoing vigilance against protectionist 
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Deglobalizing or Not?
In the past year, global trade col-
lapsed at a pace not seen since the 
Great Depression, raising concerns 
that the globalization of the past three 
decades was going into reverse. To 
a large extent, however, the scale of 
the financial crisis and its impact on 
incomes around the world can account 
for the falloff in international trade.
For the U.S., the drying up of 
trade finance may be responsible for 
trade flows declining by more than 
fundamentals warrant. We’re still a 
long way from having a good under-
standing of the vital role trade financ-
ing plays in lubricating the wheels of 
international commerce. 
From this perspective, concerns 
about deglobalization are in many 
ways overblown. Trade growth is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition 
for globalization. Declining trade is 
likewise a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for deglobalization.
Wynne, a Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas vice 
president, is director of the Bank’s Globalization 
and Monetary Policy Institute, and Kersting is 
a research associate at the institute and a visit-
ing assistant professor at Southern Methodist 
University.
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